This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its e¤ects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.
Introduction
We study a game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent considers proposing a project to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. Each player learns a private informative signal about the quality of the project, while the available public information translates into a common prior. The agent's payo¤ upon submission is determined by the evaluator's decision. The evaluator's payo¤ is determined by the quality of the projects that he accepts. Making the proposal incurs a monetary or non-monetary submission fee on the agent.
The situations that are captured by the above setting are abundant and diverse. A possible example is that of a …rm interested in undertaking a project, such as the development of an economic activity in an environmentally sensitive area, that requires …ling a costly application with a regulatory agency. In this case, the …rm is concerned with the agency's decision of whether to approve the proposal, while the regulatory agency is usually concerned with the social welfare implications of that activity. 1 A …rst …nding in this setup relates a change in the common prior with the equilibrium strategy of the evaluator. We identify the condition under which the evaluator becomes less stringent in his acceptance policy when the prior about the agent is higher. This condition is not always satis…ed and therefore, an agent with a higher prior, such as one with a better reputation of producing high-quality projects, may need to face more stringent requirements.
We then investigate the e¢ ciency e¤ects of a change in the submission fee. Leslie (2005) considers a model of one-sided incomplete information, in which the evaluator can perfectly assess the quality of a submitted project, and shows that submission fees and time delays at academic journals increase the quality of papers submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. In our model, a higher submission fee also increases the quality of projects that the agent submits, but this induces the evaluator to lower his standards of acceptance and therefore to accept projects with less favorable private signals. We identify the condition under which, on net, a higher submission fee increases the expected quality of projects that are implemented. Since this condition is not always satis…ed, it is possible for a higher submission fee to lower the expected quality of these projects. Thus, in a model with two-sided incomplete information in which the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect, we show that by accounting for the evaluator's response to an increase in the quality of projects submitted by the agent, higher submission fees can decrease the quality of projects that are implemented. 2 The closest paper to ours is Taylor and Yildirim (2011) , which studies a model in which an agent chooses the amount of e¤ort to exert in generating a project, and investigates the moral hazard e¤ects of the potentially available public information. Ottaviani and Wickelgren (2009) analyze the trade-o¤ between ex-ante and ex-post approval of an activity when the evaluator may reconsider his approval at the time when the quality of the project is revealed. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2011) study a model in which an evaluator has to select one of several competing proposals, and investigate the e¤ect of the limited capacity on the incentives of the proposers to produce information.
The Model
There are two players, an agent (A) and an evaluator (E). A owns a project and considers proposing it to E. The project is of either high (h) or low (l) quality. The common prior probability of h is 0 . An accepted project yields A a payo¤ 1, irrespective of its ex-post observed quality. Submitting the project incurs a fee on A whose monetary equivalent is c 2 (0; 1). A's payo¤ from not submitting the project is 0. Upon receiving a project from A, E has the choice of whether to accept it or not. E's payo¤ from accepting a high-quality project is 1, while his loss from accepting a low-quality project is L 2 (0; 1). E's payo¤ from rejecting a project is normalized to 0. 3
Part (ii ) of the assumption is the usual monotone likelihood ratio. Part (iii ) imposes that for extreme signals of E, information becomes almost perfect.
The Equilibrium
Consider some arbitrary strategies of A and E, respectively, ag : [0; 1] ! fs; ng and ev : [0; 1] ! fa; rg, with the obvious interpretation of the action labels. A submits a project of quality signal if and only if
where the event fag f 2 [0; 1] : ev ( ) = ag. E accepts a submitted project if and only if
where fsg f 2 [0; 1] : ag ( ) = sg.
The next lemma, whose proof is in the online appendix A1, states that in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the two players adopt cuto¤ strategies with respect to their informative signals. Therefore, a player's equilibrium strategy can be de…ned in terms of the corresponding cuto¤. For the rest of the paper, s and s will denote generic cuto¤ strategies of the two players, ( s ) and ( s ) will denote best responses, while and will refer to equilibrium strategies.
The next lemma describes the two players'best responses. Its proof is in appendix A2. 
when s 2 ( 1 ; 2 ); and (3) ( s ) = 1, for s 2 [ 2 ; 1].
(ii) E accepts a project if and only if ( s ), where ( s ) is de…ned implicitly by
In (4),
is the likelihood of h as inferred by E from the fact that A submitted the proposal. Therefore, E accepts a proposal if and only if the likelihood of h, as inferred by E from the prior
, and the fact that A submitted the proposal
, exceeds L. On the other hand, (3) states that A submits a proposal if and only if the likelihood of h, as inferred by A from the prior and from his informative signal, exceeds the corresponding ratio between the expected loss when the project is of low-quality, c 1 F l ( s ) , and the expected bene…t when it is of high quality, 1 F h ( s ) c . 5 The two best-response functions and the equilibrium are depicted in panel (a) of Figure 1 .
is the expected loss from submitting a project of low quality as it is the di¤erence between the submission cost c and the expected bene…t 1 F l ( s) 1.
The next proposition states the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium; its proof is in appendix A3.
Proposition 1
A's best response ( s ) is increasing. E's best response ( s ) is decreasing. There exists a unique equilibrium of the game, ( ; ), with 2 [0; 1) and 2 (0; 1).
Results
The …rst comparative statics of interest are with respect to the two players'relative costs of their respective actions, L and c.
When L increases, the right hand side of (4) increases, and thus the curve ( s ) shifts to the right. Since ( s ) remains unchanged, this leads to an increase in both and . Intuitively, if L increases, the incentive for E to accept a project decreases, and this induces an increase in . Anticipating a more stringent acceptance policy by E, A exerts more project screening and increases . Second, when c increases, the curve ( s ) stays …xed. Taking the derivative of the right hand side of (3) with respect to c, and using the fact that F l ( s ) > F h ( s ), 6 it follows that the curve ( s ) moves up. This leads to a decrease in and an increase in . Thus, when c increases, A exerts more project screening and increases . Knowing this, E increases his belief about the quality of projects that he receives, and lowers .
Next, we examine the e¤ect of a change in 0 on the equilibrium strategies. Note that when 0 increases, the values of and that satisfy equations (3) and (4), respectively, decrease. Thus, as depicted in panel (b) of Figure 1 , both best-response curves shift down. therefore unequivocally 6 The monotone likelihood property in assumption 1(ii ) implies stochastic dominance.
decreases: an agent who is ex-ante more likely to produce a high-quality project is more con…dent in submitting marginal projects. The change in is ambiguous, as the direct e¤ect on beliefs of the higher 0 can be o¤set by the decrease in posterior beliefs generated by A's strategy. will decrease if E's strategy is more elastic with respect 0 than with respect to A's strategy.
Proposition 3 We have: (i)
Proof. Part (i ) follows from the preceding argument. For (ii ), writing (3) and (4) in equilibrium, dividing them, and taking logarithms, we obtain
The term in the right hand side of (5) (5) is increasing in .
Thus, E becomes more lenient if the elasticity of the likelihood of h as inferred from A's threshold signal is higher than the elasticity of the likelihood of h as inferred by E from the fact that A submitted the project. It can be shown by counterexample that the condition in proposition 3(ii ) is not always satis…ed. This suggests that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards.
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of an increase in c on the expected quality of projects that are implemented, which as is isomorphic with Pr (hj ; ). 8
Proposition 4
d dc Pr (hj ; ) > 0 if and only if
Proof. By Bayes'Rule, we have
where we used the conditional independence of the two players'signals. Therefore, Pr (hj ; ) increases if and only if ln
increases. From (4), we have ln
The formal proof of the fact that c [1
, is presented in appendix A2. 8 The expected quality of the projects that are implemented is l + (h l) Pr (hj ; ).
ln L ln
, so Pr (hj ; ) increases if and only if ln
increases. Since is decreasing in c, the proof of the proposition is complete.
The condition in proposition 4 is not always satis…ed, and thus, while a higher submission fee always increases the expected quality of projects that are received for review (as elicited by the increase in ), it may lead to an inferior equilibrium outcome by lowering the evaluator's standards of acceptance to an extent that more than o¤sets the increase in the quality of projects that are submitted. 9 On the other hand, when the condition in proposition 4 is satis…ed, the e¢ ciency of the outcome can be improved by increasing c and shifting the project-screening onto the agent.
Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Appendix A1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Consider some arbitrary strategy ag of A. Then, for E's beliefs, by Bayes'Rule we have Pr(hjfsg; ) = j(fsg; jh) Pr(h) j(fsg; jh) Pr(h) + j(fsg; jl) Pr(l)
where j( j ) denotes the conditional probability density function of the relevant continuous random variable. Since A's action and the signal are conditionally independent, it follows that
= Pr(fsgjh)
Since, the last term in (7) is increasing in
, the fact that On the other hand, given some arbitrary strategy ev of E, for A's belief we have 
where the second equality follows from the fact that is redundant for A's inference about E's action when conditioning on the quality of the project. Since in any equilibrium, E uses a cuto¤ strategy, we have Pr(fagjh) Pr(fagjl) = Pr( jh) Pr( jl) = F l ( ) F h ( ). The monotone likelihood ratio property implies …rst order stochastic dominance, and thus F l ( ) F h ( ) > 0. On the other hand, by Bayes'Rule we have
which is increasing in
, and thus increasing in since 
From (1), we have then that given s , A submits a project if and only if
Note now that if s < 0 
